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Home ›CJEU - Joined cases C-141/12 Y.S v Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel C-372/12 Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel v M. and S.
Printer-friendly versionPDF version of SummaryThree third country nationals applied for lawful residence in the Netherlands and sought access under the Directive 95/46 (the Data Protection Directive) to an official administrative document (a ‘minute’) containing legal analysis in relation to the decisions on their applications.
The CJEU found that the legal analysis in itself did not constitute ‘personal data’ within the meaning of the Directive and as such there had been no infringement of the applicants’ right of access to data. In addition, Article 41(2)(b) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be interpreted as meaning that the applicant for a residence permit cannot rely on that provision against the national authorities, as it is not addressed to the Member States.
The procedure in the Netherlands for making a decision on an application for a residence permit involves the responsible case officer of the Dutch Immigration and Naturalisation Service producing an internal document to serve as either a draft decision for review or an explanatory memorandum to justify the decision. This generally contained information about the case officer, personal data of the applicant, applicable legal provisions and legal analysis.
Y.S. requested a copy of the minute following the refusal of his application for a residence permit under asylum law, and was provided with a summary of the personal data contained in the documents, the origin of the data and details of the bodies to which the data had been disclosed. Y.S. challenged the refusal of the Minister to disclose a copy of the minute in the Dutch courts which referred five questions to the CJEU.
M and S were both granted residency but were not given reasons. The refusal of their requests for access to the relevant minute was annulled by two Dutch courts. The Minister appealed against this which also led to a number of questions being referred to the CJEU.
The questions referred for a preliminary reference related to the scope and interpretation of ‘personal data’ under Article 2(a) of the Directive, in particular on whether legal analysis constitutes personal data, and whether refusal to provide a copy of the minute would infringe the applicants’ right of access to personal data under Article 12.
The Court considered it apparent that certain data contained in the minute such as the applicant’s name and date of birth constituted ‘personal data’, under the definition in Article 2(a) of the Directive. However, the legal analysis contained within the minute, while it may contain personal data, it does not of itself meet the definition, as it is information about the assessment and application by the competent authority of the law to the applicant’s situation.
This interpretation of ‘personal data’ accords with the objective and general scheme of the Directive, to protect the data subject’s fundamental rights and freedoms, in particular the right to privacy, by enabling him to be certain that personal data concerning him is correct, processed in a lawful manner and to exercise his right to have his data rectified, erased or blocked if not.
A right of access to legal analysis contained in a minute, which in not in itself liable to a check of its accuracy by the applicant, would instead serve the purpose of granting him a right of access to administrative documents, which is not a purpose covered by the Directive.
In order to comply with the Article 8 Charter right to protection of personal data and article 12(a) of the Directive the competent authority is not required to provide the applicant with a copy of the minute - it suffices to provide him with a full summary of the personal data concerning him in an intelligible form.
The right to good administration enshrined in Article 41 reflected a general principle of EU law. However, Article 41(2) (b) of the Charter could not be relied on by applicants for a residence permit against the national authorities as it is addressed not to the Member States but solely to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union.
The Court ruled that:
1. Article 2(a) of the Directive must be interpreted as meaning that certain data relating to an applicant for a residence permit contained in an administrative document, such as the ‘minute’ at issue in the main proceedings, are ‘personal data’ within the meaning of that provision, whereas, by contrast, the legal analysis cannot in itself be so classified.
2. Article 12(a) of the Directive 95/46 and Article 8(2) of the Charter must be interpreted as meaning that an applicant for a residence permit has a right of access to all personal data concerning him which are processed by the national administrative authorities. For that right to be complied with, it is sufficient that the applicant be in possession of a full summary of those data in an intelligible form, that is to say a form which allows that applicant to become aware of those data and to check that they are accurate and processed in compliance with that directive, so that he may, where relevant, exercise the rights conferred on him by that directive.
3. Article 41(2)(b) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be interpreted as meaning that the applicant for a residence permit cannot rely on that provision against the national authorities.
This decision clarifies the scope of ‘personal data’ under EU law as well as providing guidance on the form in which access to the data should be provided. As long as a full summary is provided in an intelligible form, it is not necessary to provide it ‘in the material form in which they exist or were initially recorded’, which gives national authorities a margin of discretion.
The CJEU agreed with AG Sharpston’s opinion. She noted that applicants have a valid interest in seeking access to the information to which they claim to be entitled given that the circumstances forming the basis of the decision may change or be incomplete leading to a different decision at a future time. She categorised three types of legal analysis: purely abstract, illustrative facts unrelated to an identifiable person or event and the legal classification of facts relating to an identified or identifiable person and their assessment against the background of the applicable law; the latter being the only type within the scope of the Directive.
Steve Peers of the EU Law Analysis blog provides a case comment: “Data protection rights and administrative proceedings”, Steve Peers, 17 July 2014
For a full analysis of Advocate-General Sharpston’s opinion, see: "Legal analysis of individuals situation is not their personal data says advocate general" , 11KBW Panopticon blog, Robin Hopkins, December 18th, 2013
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Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data
Regulation No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data