CJEU - Case C‑163/17 Jawo, 19 March 2019

The CJEU divided the decision according to the questions made by the German authorities. 

First, the referring court asked how to interpret the second sentence of Article 29(2) of the Dublin III Regulation for it to be considered that the person concerned has absconded within the meaning of that provision. In that regard, the Court ruled that the sentence must be interpreted as meaning that an applicant ‘absconds’ where they deliberately evade the reach of the national authorities responsible for carrying out their transfer, with the intention of preventing the transfer and that the applicant retains the possibility of demonstrating that the fact that he has not informed the authorities of his absence is due to valid reasons and not the intention to evade the reach of those authorities.

Secondly, the referring court asked how Article 27(1) of the Dublin III Regulation should be interpreted.  The Court’s answer to that question was that this article must be interpreted as meaning that, in proceedings brought against a transfer decision, the person concerned may rely on Article 29(2) of that regulation by pleading that the transfer time limit has expired because he had not absconded.

Another question made by the referring court was whether the second sentence of Article 29(2) of the Dublin III Regulation should be interpreted as meaning that, to extend the transfer time limit by a maximum of 18 months, it suffices that the requesting Member State informs the Member State responsible, before the expiry of the six-month transfer time limit, that the person concerned has absconded and specifies, at the same time, a new transfer time limit, or whether those two Member States needed to agree upon the new time limit. The Court decided that this rule must be interpreted as the first option suggests, in other words, suffices that one Member State inform the other, but they don’t need to agree.

Finally, the referring court asked how to interpret Article 4 of the Charter. Furthermore, the referring court was uncertain as to whether that question falls within the scope of EU law. It also questioned what criteria should guide the national court’s assessment of the living conditions of a person to whom international protection has been granted.

The answer to these questions given by the Court was that EU law must be interpreted as meaning that the question of whether Article 4 of the Charter precludes the transfer or not, falls within its scope. Article 4 of the Charter must be interpreted as not precluding a transfer of an applicant for international protection, unless the court hearing an action challenging the transfer decision finds, based on information that is objective, reliable, specific and properly updated and having regard to the standard of protection of fundamental rights guaranteed by EU law, that that risk is real for that applicant, because, should he be transferred, he would find himself, irrespective of his wishes and personal choices, in a situation of extreme material poverty.