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Home ›UK - Supreme Court, 17 March 2010, JS (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2010] UKSC 15
International Law > 1951 Refugee Convention > Art 1F
European Union Law > EN - Qualification Directive, Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 > Art 12 > Art 12.2 (a)
European Union Law > EN - Qualification Directive, Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 > Art 12 > Art 12.3
Rome Statute of the ICC - Art 7
Rome Statute of the ICC - Art 8
Rome Statute of the ICC - Art 25
Rome Statute of the ICC - Art 28
UK - Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006 - Reg 2
UK - Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006 - Reg 7(1)


Membership of an organisation that was responsible for committing war crimes is not sufficient on its own to justify exclusion under Article 1F(a) of the Refugee Convention or Article 12(2)(a) of the Qualification Directive. Membership of the LTTE or its ‘Intelligence Division” was not enough, on its own, to justify the applicant’s exclusion.
Responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity should be considered with regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and other international legal materials that have come into existence following the adoption of the Refugee Convention.
The decision maker should concentrate on the actual role played by the particular persons, taking all material aspects of that role into account so as to decide whether the required degree of participation is established. The Court identified a non-exhaustive list of some of the relevant factors that should be considered.
The applicant was a member of the LTTE. The Secretary of State had concluded that there were serious reasons for considering that he had committed war crimes, and refused to grant him asylum, granting 6 months discretionary leave to enter. The applicant applied for Judicial Review of the decision.
The applicant had joined the LTTE, aged 10 and, almost immediately afterwards, joined the Intelligence Division performing multiple roles including being involved in military operations against the Sri Lankan army. After his 18th birthday, he led a unit that transported military equipment through the jungle along with other members of the ‘Intelligence Division’ who would be sent in plain clothes into Colombo. He became a trusted bodyguard of the leader of the ‘Intelligence Division’ before being deployed in plain clothes to Colombo. After he heard that his identity had been uncovered, he fled to the UK and claimed asylum.
The Supreme Court held that mere membership of the LTTE or its ‘Intelligence Division’ was not sufficient to establish that there were serious reasons for considering that the applicant had committed a war crime. His application for asylum should therefore be reconsidered.
The starting point for interpreting the terms crimes against humanity and war crimes should be Articles 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Articles 25 and 30 of the Rome Statute define the circumstances in which individual criminal responsibility for these crimes is established.
Article 12(3) of the Qualification Directive provides that Article 12(2)(a) (which replicates the terms of Article 1F(a)) "applies to persons who instigate or otherwise participate in the commission of the crimes or acts mentioned therein." The Supreme Court approved the German Federal Administrative Court’s interpretation of this provision in BVerwG 10C 48.07. That Court had held that: “the person seeking protection need not have committed the serious non-political crime himself, but he must be personally responsible for it. This must in general be assumed if a person has committed the crime personally, or made a substantial contribution to its commission, in the knowledge that his or her act or omission would facilitate the criminal conduct... Thus this principle covers not only active terrorists and participants in the criminal sense, but also persons who perform advance acts in support of terrorist activities. . .”
The Supreme Court held that “one needs...to concentrate on the actual role played by the particular persons, taking all material aspects of that role into account so as to decide whether the required degree of participation is established”. The Court identified a non-exhaustive list of relevant factors to consider in making this assessment. They were:
“(i) the nature and (potentially of some importance) the size of the organisation and particularly that part of it with which the asylum-seeker was himself most directly concerned; (ii) whether and, if so, by whom the organisation was proscribed; (iii) how the asylum-seeker came to be recruited, (iv) the length of time he remained in the organisation and what, if any, opportunities he had to leave it; (v) his position, rank, standing and influence in the organisation; (vi) his knowledge of the organisation's war crimes activities, and; (vii) his own personal involvement and role in the organisation including particularly whatever contribution he made towards the commission of war crimes”
Secretary of State’s appeal was dismissed. The Secretary of State was ordered to reconsider the applicant’s asylum claim.
The Supreme Court expressly disapproved two aspects of the guidance given in the case of Gurung. First, there should not be a presumption that there were serious reasons for considering that those who are members of an organisation “whose aims, methods and activities are predominantly terrorist in character” were complicit in war crimes. The nature of the organisation that the applicant was a member of was only one factor that had to be considered. Secondly, it was unhelpful to consider that there was a continuum of war crimes, particular with reference to the aims and aspirations of any organisation. “War crimes are war crimes however benevolent and estimable may be the long-term aims of those concerned. And actions which would not otherwise constitute war crimes do not become so merely because they are taken pursuant to policies abhorrent to western liberal democracies”.
Lord Brown held, obiter, although the burden of proof on the state to show that there were serious reasons for considering that an applicant should be excluded under Article 1(F)(a), the standard of proof is “lower than that applicable in actual war crimes trials. Lord Brown held that "serious reasons for considering" obviously imports a higher test for exclusion than would, say, an expression like "reasonable grounds for suspecting". "Considering" approximates rather to "believing" than to "suspecting".” He approved the approach of Sedley LJ in Yasser Al-Sirri v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 222: "[the phrase used] sets a standard above mere suspicion. Beyond this, it is a mistake to try to paraphrase the straightforward language of the Convention: it has to be treated as meaning what it says."
This decision pre-dated the CJEU’s ruling in Abdulla et al. (C-175/08).
ICTY Statute
Addressing Security Concerns without Undermining Refugee Protection: UNHCR's Perspective of 29 November 2001
Canada - Nagamany v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1554
Canada - Ramirez v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1992) 89 DLR (4th) 173
Germany - Federal Administrative Court, 14 October 2008, 10 C 48.07
ICTY - Prosecutor v Brdjanin (unreported) 3 April 2007
ICTY - Prosecutor v Krajišnik 17 March 2009
UK - DKN v Asylum and Immigration Tribunal [2009] CSIH 53
UK - Gurung [2002] UKIAT 04870
UK - KJ (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 292
UK - MH (Syria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 226
UK - Yasser Al-Sirri v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 222
United States - McMullen v INS 685 F 2d 1312, 599